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PENDEKATAN BERASASKAN PERATURAN UNTUK MENGESAN 
BOTNET MENGGUNAKAN PELAYAN NAMA DOMAIN 
 
 
 ABSTRAK 
 
 Botnet merupakan suatu cabaran serius yang dihadapi oleh Internet sejak 
kebelakangan ini, membawa kerugian ekonomi kepada organisasi dan individu. Botnet 
terdiri daripada ribuan hos terjangkit yang menerima arahan daripada pelayan kawal 
dan perintah (C&C) yang dikendalikan oleh seseorang individu. Mengikut tradisi, 
pelayan saling bual Internet (IRC) digunakan sebagai pelayan C&C; mereka 
berkomunikasi dengan botnet melalui saluran IRC. Ini selalunya menyebabkan 
pentadbir rangkaian menyekat trafik IRC di rangkaian tersebut. Trend terbaru dalam 
pengerahan tugas botnet melibatkan penggunaan saluran komunikasi alternatif, seperti 
pelayan sistem nama domain, antara pelayan C&C dan hos terjangkit (bot).  
Penggunaan saluran komunikasi alternatif telah membolehkan botnet untuk memintas 
tapisan rangkaian yang sedia ada.  Tambahan, saluran-saluran ini tidak boleh disekat 
dengan mudahnya kerana trafik IRC adalah penting untuk aktiviti biasa rangkaian. 
Lebih lagi, botnet baru, seperti Conficker, Zeus dan Citadel telah menggunakan fluks-
cepat DNS untuk mengelakkan pengesanan dan mengelakkan penyelidik daripada 
mencari dan menutup pelayan C&C. Oleh itu, tesis ini mencadangkan pendekatan 
berasaskan peraturan untuk mengesan botnet berasaskan DNS (RADBDNS), yang 
dapat meningkatkan kejituan pengesanan botnet yang berasaskan kepada trafik DNS. 
Pendekatan ini adalah berasaskan kepada peraturan yang bergantung kepada tingkah-
laku pertanyaan dan maklum-balas DNS. RADBDNS terdiri daripada tiga peringkat: 
(1) pra-pemprosesan data untuk menapis trafik DNS daripada trafik rangkaian, dengan 
itu memberi fokus kepada sebahagian kecil trafik rangkaian tersebut untuk 
 xiii 
 
mengurangkan overhed sistem ; (2) Pemilihan ciri-ciri DNS untuk memilih ciri-ciri 
yang paling bererti yang menyumbang kepada pengesanan botnet berasaskan DNS; 
dan (3) Pengesanan botnet berasaskan DNS untuk mengesan tingkah-laku abnormal 
pertanyaan dan maklum balas DNS dengan mengaplikasikan peraturan yang 
dicadangkan; hos yang memperlihatkan tingkah-laku abnormal pertanyaan dan 
maklum-balas DNS akan dikenalpasti sebagai bot. Pendekatan yang dicadangkan telah 
dinilai dengan menggunakan dua dataset tanda aras dalam dua senario. Dalam senario 
pertama, pendekatan yang dicadangkan diaplikasikan ke atas dataset ISOT, yang 
mengandungi trafik botnet serta trafik normal. Dalam senario kedua,  pendekatan yang 
dicadangkan diaplikasikan ke atas dataset NIMS, yang mengandungi trafik botnet dan 
trafik normal secara berasingan. Keputusan penilaian menunjukkan pendekatan yang 
dicadangkan dapat mengesan botnet berasaskan DNS dengan kejituan sebanyak 
99.66% dengan kadar positif palsu sebanyak 0.23%. Sementara itu, keberkesanan 
pendekatan yang dicadangkan itu dinilai dengan membandingkannya dengan 
pendekatan-pendekatan DNS yang lebih dikenali dan keputusan yang didapati 
menunjukkan bahawa pendekatan yang dicadangkan  mempunyai prestasi yang lebih 
baik berbanding dengan pendekatan lain.  
  
 xiv 
 
RULE-BASED APPROACH FOR DETECTING BOTNET BASED ON 
DOMAIN NAME SYSTEM 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 Botnets are a serious problem in today’s Internet, and they result in economic 
damage for organizations and individuals. Botnets consist of thousands of infected 
hosts that receive instructions from command and control (C&C) servers operated by 
an individual. Traditionally, Internet Relay Chat (IRC) servers are used as C&C 
servers and communicate with the botnet through IRC channels. As a result, network 
administrators often block IRC traffic on their networks. Recent trends in botnet 
development have seen the use of alternative communication channels, such as domain 
name server (DNS), between the C&C servers and infected hosts (bots). The use of 
alternative communication channels has allowed botnets to bypass common network 
filters. Furthermore, these channels cannot be blocked as simply as IRC traffic because 
they are essential for normal network activity. Recent botnets such as Conficker, Zeus, 
and Citadel have used DNS fast flux to avoid detection and to reduce the ability of 
researchers to find and shut down the C&C servers. Therefore, this thesis proposes a 
rule-based approach for detecting botnet based on DNS (RADBDNS), which can 
enhance the accuracy of detecting botnets based on DNS traffic. RADBDNS uses a 
rule based on DNS query and response behaviors, and it consists of the following three 
stages: (1) data pre-processing to filter DNS traffic from the network traffic in the 
datasets, (2) DNS feature selection to select the most significant features that 
contribute to the detection of the botnet based on DNS, and (3) DNS-based botnet 
detection, which aims to detect abnormal behavior of DNS queries and responses by 
applying the proposed rules on DNS queries and responses. The host that exhibits 
 xv 
 
abnormality in DNS queries or DNS responses will be identified as a bot. The proposed 
approach is evaluated using two benchmark datasets in two scenarios. The first 
scenario applies the proposed approach on the ISOT dataset, which contains botnet 
traffic along with legitimate traffic. The second scenario applies the proposed approach 
on the NIMS dataset, which contains legitimate traffic and malicious traffic separately. 
The result shows that the proposed approach can detect the botnet-based DNS with 
99.66% accuracy and a false positive rate of 0.23%. The effectiveness of the proposed 
approach is evaluated through a comparison with well-known DNS-based approach. 
Results show that the proposed approach outperforms other approach. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The internet has become an element of critical infrastructure that plays a vital role in 
people’s lives, encompassing communication, education, government services, 
banking, and commerce. Naturally, these segments are targeted throughout the Internet 
by malicious attackers. One of the most prominent emerging malicious systems is the 
botnet. Botnets have become a serious threat to the web (AsSadhan et al., 2017; Silva 
et al., 2013). Using botnets, attackers can gain control of large-scale distributed 
networks associated with the infected machines to achieve their goals (Bilge et al., 
2014).  
As botnets proliferate, they have been causing significant losses to the global 
economy. For example, a cyber-attack on Christmas Eve against the website of a 
financial institution in regional California helped to distract bank officials from an 
online account takeover against one of its clients, netting cyber thieves more than 
$900,000 (Harris et al., 2014). Another example is the use of botnets in online banking 
transactions, resulting in estimated losses of over 100 million dollars (e Silva, 2017). 
Furthermore, advertisers have lost at least $346 million owing to the actions of less 
than 15% of the botnet population (Chen et al., 2017b). According to the Arbor report 
(2015), botnets triggered 76% of the distributed denial of services (DDoS) attacks, as 
shown in Figure 1.1 (Arbor, 2015). The other botnet activity represents 47% of attacks. 
Thus, botnets represent a major security concern.  
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Figure 1.1: Botnet Representation Issue in 2015, Source: (Arbor, 2015) 
 
1.1 Background 
This Section provides an explanation of botnets, the domain name system (DNS), and 
DNS-based botnet detection techniques. 
 
1.1.1 Botnet 
A botnet is a group of infected computers on the Internet controlled by a botmaster 
through command and control (C&C) servers (Kwon et al., 2016; Yu, 2014). Botnets 
perform many activities such as click fraud, spam, DDoS attacks, and hosting phishing 
pages, as shown in Figure 1.2. Botnets utilize a hidden communication channel to 
receive commands from their operator and communicate their current status (Tiirmaa-
Klaar et al., 2013b). Botnets sizes have increased dramatically in recent years, to the 
extent that networks of more than one million machines can launch cyber-attacks 
(Yukonhiatou et al., 2014). These botnets need to control and manage all their 
distributed infected machines using a reliable system. One method to manage botnets 
is through the DNS.  
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Figure 1.2: Botnet Activity 
 
1.1.2 Domain Name System (DNS) 
The DNS is a service provided by the Internet to translate domain names into internet 
protocol (IP) addresses (Agrawal et al., 2014; Li et al., 2017). The distributed and 
global nature of the DNS inspires cyber criminals to perpetrate attacks on a global 
scale. Consequently, the DNS is highly misused by attackers to manage their botnets 
(He et al., 2010). Such attacks enable widespread exploitation by malicious systems 
and result in significant losses. 
Recently, domain names have been used to operate malicious networks, such 
as botnets and other types of malicious software (malware). Studies have revealed that 
it is a challenge to keep track of malicious domains by web content analysis or human 
observation, because of the large number of domains (Davuth and Kim, 2013; Kwon 
et al., 2016). 
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1.1.3 DNS-based Botnet Detection Approaches  
There are two methods for discovering active botnets (Rahim and Bin Muhaya, 2010): 
active detection, which involves capturing live instances of running botnets, and 
passive detection, which involves capturing suspicious traffic from the network (Govil 
and Govil, 2007). Although many DNS-based botnet detection approaches have been 
proposed, such as (Antonakakis et al., 2010; Antonakakis et al., 2011), (Holz et al., 
2008), (Perdisci et al., 2009), and (Bilge et al., 2011; Bilge et al., 2014), these 
approaches suffer from limitations, such as high false positive detection rates, and 
require the selection of many features. Additionally, the error in the classification 
process increases over time, especially when dealing with unknown botnet attack. 
Therefore, new approaches are needed to increase the detection of unknown botnets, 
because several proposed methods are unable to successfully detect these threats 
(García et al., 2014). 
 
1.2 Research Motivation  
Researchers consider botnets to be critical tools for criminals, because of the low risk 
and high potential profit associated with their use. Botnet programs are growing faster 
than the response of security firms, and they represent a serious threat to the existence 
of the commercial Internet (e Silva, 2017).  
Infections on the Internet caused by malware are estimated to account for 16–
25% of global Internet traffic, which comes from communication between various 
types of malware (Camelo et al., 2014). Botnets are used by criminals for gaining 
economic profit, as well as for politically motivated activities. Although many efforts 
have been made recently to mitigate the effectiveness of botnets, newer and more 
sophisticated versions are likely to re-emerge (Tiirmaa-Klaar et al., 2013a). 
 5 
 
The existing detection approaches of DNS-based botnets that use simple 
heuristics are inefficient, because modern botnets are sophisticated and encrypted. 
This has motivated researchers to suggest many approaches that can monitor DNS 
traffic to detect botnets. Such approaches include the following: 
• Increasing the attention of DNS-based botnet detection approaches as efficient 
techniques in the Internet security and monitoring fields. These approaches can 
be implemented to detect the abnormal DNS traffic, which leads to the 
detection of DNS-based botnets.  
• Needs to differentiate between DNS with trusted reputations and the domain 
names generated by botnets. 
1.3 Research Problem  
The botnet phenomenon is one of the most significant threats to cyber security, 
providing cybercriminals with a distributed platform for several illegal activities, such 
as launching DDoS attacks, click fraud, phishing, identity theft, and spamming (Garg 
and Sharma, 2017; Kirubavathi and Anitha, 2014). According to McAfee Labs, the 
number of newly discovered malware samples reached approximately 11 million in 
the fourth quarter of 2012 (Shi et al., 2013), and botnets represent a more dangerous 
threat to the internet (Chen and Lin, 2015). This illustrates the importance of 
developing efficient and useful detection approaches to control botnets.  
 DNS is a fundamental element of the functionality of the Internet, and the 
security of DNS affects the entire Internet (Shan et al., 2014). Botnets use DNS as 
alternative communication channels between the C&C servers and infected hosts 
(bots) (Frosch et al.). The use of alternative communication channels has allowed 
botnets to bypass common network filters. Moreover, these channels cannot be 
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blocked as simply as IRC traffic, which has been used in traditional botnets, as they 
are essential for normal network activity. Furthermore, recent botnets such as 
Conficker have used DNS fast-flux to avoid detection and to reduce the ability of 
researchers to find and shut down the C&C servers (Davuth and Kim, 2013). 
There are many approaches designed for botnet detection. The common 
detection approaches include signature-based detection, anomaly-based detection, 
mining-based detection, and DNS-based detection (Feily et al., 2009; Rahim et al., 
2014). The DNS-based detection methods do not need specific knowledge about the 
botnet protocol and structure, and these can thus be a more efficient way of detecting 
botnets (Kang, 2011). Nevertheless, botnets are becoming more sophisticated, and 
resistant to detection. There are many approaches that can be used to evade detection, 
such as encrypted communication, domain generation algorithm (DGA), fast-flux, and 
double fast-flux (Camelo et al., 2014). 
The appropriate selection of features has critical positive impact on the 
performance of detection approaches. As a result, botnet detection approaches require 
optimization of the chosen feature set to capture the relevant botnet traffic heuristics 
(Stevanovic and Pedersen, 2013). Additionally, the existing DNS-based botnet 
detection approaches can detect real-world botnets with a considerably high false 
positive rate, which leads to a reduction in the accuracy of DNS-based botnet 
detection, because they do not take into consideration the features that significantly 
contribute to detecting botnets based on DNS. One of the main limitations of the 
existing approaches is the high false positive rate (Ji et al., 2014).  
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The research problem can be summarized as follows: 
• The existing approaches for detecting botnets based on DNS traffic do not 
consider the significant features in the DNS packet that can contribute to 
detecting botnets accurately.  
• Most of existing approaches for detecting botnets based on DNS traffic suffer 
from high rates of false positive detection.  
 
1.4 Research Objectives  
The main goal of this research is to propose a rule-based approach for DNS-based 
botnet detection with improved accuracy. The following objectives are set to achieve 
the main goal of this research:  
• To propose an ensemble feature selection mechanism to select the distinguished 
features to characterize the behavior of botnets based on DNS.  
• To propose a set of new features that contribute to the detection of botnets based 
on DNS queries and DNS responses. 
• To propose a rule-based mechanism to detect the DNS-based botnets. 
• To evaluate the proposed approach and compare it with existing DNS-based botnet 
detection approach in terms of accuracy detection and false positive rate.  
 
1.5 Research Scope  
This research aims to differentiate between botnet-based DNS traffic and legitimate 
DNS traffic by focusing on the DNS query and response behaviors. The proposed 
approach is limited to detecting botnets based on DNS traffic in IPv4 and IPv6 
environments with two benchmark datasets, as presented in Table 1.1. 
 8 
 
Table 1.1: Research Scope 
No Items Scope of Research 
1.  Environment IPv4 & Ipv6 
2.  Attack type Botnet based on DNS 
3.  Target layer  Application layer (DNS) 
4.  Features Selection DNS Queries and DNS Responses 
5.  Dataset Benchmark dataset (ISOT, NIMS) 
6.  
DNS query and DNS response 
features  
DNS query and DNS response features 
will be determined by analyzing 
Waledac, Zeus, Conficker, and Citadel 
DNS traffic 
7.  Performance Metrics  Accuracy, False Positive 
 
1.6 Research Contributions 
The main contribution of this research is proposing a rule-based approach, which is 
designed to more accurately detect botnets based on DNS, called the rule-based 
approach for DNS-based botnet detection (RADBDNS). The contributions of this 
research are summarized as follows:  
• An ensemble feature selection mechanism to select the distinguished features 
that can characterize botnets on based DNS. 
• A set of new features that contribute the detection of botnets based on DNS. 
• A rule-based mechanism to detect the DNS-based Botnet. 
1.7 Research Steps  
This research is conducted using a combination of theoretical analysis and experiments 
to examine the performance of security approaches that detect botnets based on DNS 
traffic using DNS query and response behaviors. Figure 1.3 depicts the complete 
research steps of this research. The proposed approach includes the detection of 
botnets based on DNS traffic. Thus, many botnets defeated the detection, and the 
 9 
 
failure caused by the attacker can be minimized. As illustrated in Figure 1.3, there are 
four research steps to achieve our goals: 
The first phase is the literature review. This step starts with an investigation 
of the types of botnet attack based on DNS, followed by a study of the life cycle of 
botnets, and a review of previous work and related botnet detection approaches based 
on DNS traffic. 
The second phase is the analysis. This phase starts with an investigation of the 
problems of the existing botnet detection approaches. Then, the approaches used in 
botnet detection based on DNS are considered to identify the limitations of these 
approaches. As a result, the problem statement of this work is identified to outline the 
proposed approach.   
The third phase is the design and modeling. This phase presents how to design 
the proposed approach and discusses the feature extraction for the proposed approach 
to enhance the detection performance, which works on two main behaviors of botnet 
based on DNS: abnormal DNS query behaviors and abnormal DNS response 
behaviors. Then the rule-based approach for behavior detection is discussed and 
presented.  
The fourth phase is the performance evaluation. This phase discusses the 
implementation and experimental environment to evaluate the performance of the 
proposed approach. This phase starts with the approach implementation and then 
results in an analysis considering performance parameters such as the accuracy and 
false positive detection rate. 
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Figure 1.3: Research Steps 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.3: Research Steps 
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1.8 Thesis Organization  
This thesis is structured into the following six chapters: 
Chapter 1 presents the background, research problem, research motivation, 
scope, objectives, and contributions of this research. This chapter also discusses the 
need for detection approaches for botnet based on DNS traffic.  
Chapter 2 discusses the background of the research and related studies. This 
chapter critically reviews the existing approaches for the detection of botnets based on 
DNS traffic and presents their advantages and limitations. Moreover, this chapter 
shows a new taxonomy for approaches of botnets based on DNS. Finally, this chapter 
comprehensively discusses the gaps in the existing approaches. 
Chapter 3 explains the methodology phases of the proposed approach for the 
detection of botnet based on DNS traffic within network traffic. Additionally, it 
describes the integrated phases of the proposed approach. 
Chapter 4 presents the design and tools used for the proposed approach. This 
chapter contains the feature selection and rules designs of the proposed approach. This 
chapter also explains the implementation of the phases in detail. 
Chapter 5 reports the experiments and their results. It also presents a 
comprehensive analysis of the results achieved using the proposed approach. In 
addition, this chapter evaluates the performance of the proposed approach in 
comparison with existing approaches. 
Chapter 6 presents the conclusions drawn from our work and suggests possible 
directions for future research. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter has discussed the importance of botnet detection approaches 
based on DNS. This chapter presents a detailed and comprehensive background of 
botnet detection, particularly botnet detection based on DNS traffic. It also presents an 
overview of most approaches used in detection of botnets based on DNS to provide an 
understanding of the proposed research in the field of botnet detection based on DNS 
traffic characteristics. In addition, this chapter provides a review of the most well-
known DNS-based botnet detection approaches. The chapter is organized as follows. 
Section 2.2 provides a background of botnets, Section 2.3 discusses the related works 
in the botnet detection based on DNS, Section 2.4 formulates the feature selection for 
botnet detection based on DNS, and the chapter is summarized in Section 2.5.  
 
2.2 Background  
The increasing reliance on the Internet nowadays presents many challenges in terms 
of managing the Internet and the application usage, such as protecting user data, 
privacy, integrity, and availability. In the last few years, the Internet has played a 
central role in the world, especially in the sectors of communication, education, 
government services, and banking (Stevanovic et al., 2012). Unfortunately, the 
increasing demand for applications become a threat to user privacy and data security 
(Stevanovic and Pedersen, 2013). This section discusses in detail the growth of 
botnets, an overview of DNS, and the botnet life cycle with botnets depending on DNS.  
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2.2.1 Growth of Botnet   
A botnet is a software program that infects computers, known as bots, and manipulates 
them for malicious purposes. Bots run small scripts built to carry out specific 
automated tasks (Alomari et al., 2012). These bots are controlled by one or a small 
collaborative group of attackers known as ‘‘botmasters” (Lu et al., 2011b). Based on 
statistics from McAfee Labs (McAfee., 2015), the number of newly discovered 
malware samples reached 50 million in the fourth quarter of 2014 and is expected to 
reach 500 million by the end of 2015. Moreover, the Internet traffic consists of up to 
80% of botnet traffic related to SPAM emails originating from known botnets such as 
Grum, Cutwail, and Rustock (Karim et al., 2014). Currently, a large-scale botnet may 
consist of more than one million PCs launching cyber-attacks (Yukonhiatou et al., 
2014).  
Botnets differ from other types of malware by utilizing communication 
channels to receive commands and report their current status to their operator(s) 
(Tiirmaa-Klaar et al., 2013b). According to a 2013 FBI report, 10 international hackers 
were arrested for using botnets to steal more than $850 million through a group of 
compromised computers, using stolen personal financial information (Hsu et al., 
2017).  
 In fact, botnets have specific characteristics as compared to other types of 
malware. For instance, a botmaster can control the infected machines and send 
commands without directly communicating with them. There are also many bots 
working in a coordinated way and taking instructions from the botmaster to instantiate 
coordinated attacks such as DDoS, spam distribution, and click fraud (Emre, 2011).  
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Additionally, botnets provide these frauds as services from the botnet operators, which 
are considered part of the botnet economy (Tiirmaa-Klaar et al., 2013a).     
Botnets are one of the most significant threats to cyber security, as they are 
considered a launching pad for several illegal activities such as DDoS, click fraud 
(ALmomani et al., 2013), phishing, identity theft (Al-Momani et al., 2011), spamming 
(Kirubavathi and Anitha, 2014), phishing, and malware distribution (Zeidanloo et al., 
2010). Until now, there exists no permanent solution for the detection or mitigation of 
botnet threats, because their approaches and methods keep changing over time (Karim 
et al., 2014).  
2.2.2 Overview of Domain Name System (DNS) 
DNS is a fundamental element of the functionality of the Internet, which converts 
domain names to their corresponding IP addresses. However, the security of the DNS 
is the responsibility of the whole Internet collaboratively (Shan et al., 2014). The 
distributed and global system of the DNS motivates the cyber criminals to attack on a 
global scale (Davuth and Kim, 2013). To commit their crimes, attackers make use of 
DNS services to operate malicious networks, such as botnets and other types of 
malware (He et al., 2010). 
In addition, studies have demonstrated the challenges in tracking malicious 
domains using web content analysis or human observation owing to the huge number 
of available domains within cyberspace (Davuth and Kim, 2013).Unfortunately, 
botnets use the DNS traffic as any other legitimate host, which makes differentiating 
legitimate DNS traffic from illegitimate traffic a very challenging problem (Manasrah 
et al., 2009). Moreover, botnet owners attempt to hide their communication with the 
bots to obstruct any deployed botnet detection processes (Rodríguez-Gómez et al., 
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2013). The attackers or botmasters use the DNS services to hide their C&C IP address 
to make the botnets reliable and easy to migrate from one server to another without 
being noticed (Choi et al., 2007). 
The use of DNS as an alternative communication channel has allowed botnets 
to bypass common network filters. Moreover, these channels cannot be blocked as 
easily as IRC traffic can be, as they are essential for regular network activity. 
Furthermore, recent botnets such as Conficker, Zeus, and Citadel have used DNS fast-
flux to avoid detection and to reduce the ability of researchers to find and shut down 
the C&C servers (Haddadi et al., 2015; Perdisci et al., 2012).  
 
2.2.3 Botnet Life Cycle 
The botnet detection process stands as an ongoing challenge for researchers and 
organizations. Therefore, understanding the botnet life cycle and their architecture may 
yield better detection mechanisms. 
Generally, botnets apply a similar set of steps to recruit members and form the 
zombie army. These steps can be considered as the botnet life cycle. Figure 2.1 
illustrates the steps of any botnet life cycle. The bots can typically be created and 
preserved in four phases, as shown in Figure 2.1. 
 
2.2.3(a) Exploitation Phase 
This phase is the first step in the botnet life cycle. The botmaster makes a remote 
infection by exploiting an existing vulnerability of software running on the victim host. 
The botmaster defrauds the victim user to execute malicious code on his machine, such 
as opening an email attachment (Abu Rajab et al., 2006). In this phase, the bots need 
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to connect to a remote server to download the bot binaries. The connection to a remote 
server is established only after a DNS lookup command is issued by the compromised 
machine to map a domain name to its corresponding IP address (Abdullah et al., 2013). 
This behavior of issuing a DNS lookup query is the dominant behavior of almost all 
botnets that exist in cyberspace (Manasrah et al., 2009).  
2.2.3(b) Rallying Phase 
In this phase, bots connect back to their botmaster through porting to a C&C server. 
The botmaster intends to make his botnet portable and stealth at the same time. 
Therefore, the botmaster equips his bots with a DNS lookup functionality to be able to 
perform DNS queries to locate the C&C server. Unfortunately, botmasters have learnt 
that a static IP address of the C&C is not effective, and vulnerable to identification and 
blacklisting. Therefore, they start to misuse the DNS services to hide the location of 
the C&C server behind a domain name rather than a static IP address. As a result, bots 
will rally to connect back to the C&C server as soon as they obtain the location of the 
required server (Choi et al., 2007). This phase is considered vital to the success 
maintenance of the stealth nature and power of the botnet (Liu et al., 2008). 
2.2.3(c) Attack Execution Phase 
In this phase, the group of bots performs malicious activities on target machines as 
instructed by the botmaster through sending the required commands to the C&C 
servers. Bots will then fetch the command from the C&C server and start the malicious 
activity. For instance, the group of bots may receive commands from the C&C server 
to redirect users’ requests to certain malicious websites by capturing the users’ DNS 
queries (Rodríguez-Gómez et al., 2013). 
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2.2.3(d) Update and Maintenance Phase 
The last phase of the botnet life cycle is updating and maintaining the bots of the 
botnets. The botmaster needs to keep his bots up-to-date through instructing the bots 
to update their binaries from time to time for better coordination and patching (Karim 
et al., 2014). Moreover, botmasters may require migrating his C&C server location 
frequently to evade the various detection measures (Karim et al., 2014). Understanding 
this phase is very important, because botnets can be identified by observing the same 
network behaviors and communication patterns/frequency from the bots to their C&C 
server. 
 
Figure 2.1: Botnet Life Cycle 
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2.3 Related Work 
For the purpose of detecting botnets, different approaches were proposed to eliminate 
the danger of botnets attack. Moreover, researchers have produced different 
classifications for better understanding the botnet phenomenon and its structure (Feily 
et al., 2009; Jing et al., 2009; Karim et al., 2014; Khattak et al., 2013; Rodríguez-
Gómez et al., 2013; Silva et al., 2013). The botnet detection approaches were mainly 
classified into two types: those based on installing and configuring a HoneyNet within 
the monitored network, and the IDS (Abdullah et al., 2013; Jing et al., 2009; Silva et 
al., 2013; Zeidanloo et al., 2010). A classification of botnet detection approaches based 
on analyzing DNS traffic is shown in Figure 2.2. 
 
2.3.1 HoneyNet-based Approaches    
   
HoneyNet-based approaches are used mainly to analyze and understand the behaviors 
and the characteristics of botnets. HoneyNets emulate known software and network 
vulnerabilities to be infected by botnets (Khattak et al., 2013). HoneyNets are prepared 
to be self-contained and thwart the extension of botnets. In addition, HoneyNets are 
used to discover the capabilities of unknown attacks, the C&C system, the attackers’ 
tools, approaches, and motivation (Karim et al., 2014). Different approaches were 
proposed based on HoneyNet systems to capture botnet characteristics, such as in (Abu 
Rajab et al., 2006; Dagon et al., 2006; Li et al., 2009b; Oberheide et al., 2007; Pham 
and Dacier, 2011; Rieck et al., 2010).  
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Figure 2.2: Classification of Botnet Detection Approaches Based on DNS Traffic 
Characteristics 
 
HoneyNets are important to understanding botnet characteristics and 
technology (Silva et al., 2013; Zeidanloo et al., 2010). One of the known works on a 
HoneyNet that uses DNS queries is that proposed by (Oberheide et al., 2007) who 
applies some basic statistics to the collected DNS queries. This work dealt with DNS 
queries targeting unused (i.e., darknet) address spaces and developed the concept of 
the honeydns system to assist honeypots to prevent the attackers from initiating their 
attacks (Aiello et al., 2014a; Aiello et al., 2014b).  
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HoneyNet-based systems are easy to build and deploy with minimum cost and 
resource requirements. Nevertheless, there are some drawbacks of the HoneyNet 
systems, including limited scalability and interaction with malicious activities. 
Moreover, attackers may use the honeyNet to learn new evasion approaches (Karim et 
al., 2014). As a result, HoneyNets are aimed to recognize the features and mechanisms 
of botnets, but cannot detect bot infections all the time (Zeidanloo et al., 2010). 
 
2.3.2 Intrusion Detection System (IDS) 
The IDSs for botnet detection can be classified into two approaches: signature-based 
IDS (Abdullah et al., 2013; Panimalar and Rameshkumar, 2014) and 
anomaly/behavior-based IDS (Gu et al., 2007; Jing et al., 2009; Li et al., 2009a; Silva 
et al., 2013; Vania et al., 2013). 
 
2.3.2(a) Signature-based IDS 
Signature-based approaches detect only known bots through signature matching using 
an IDS detection system such as SNORT (SNORT). A DNS-based Black List 
(DNSBL) approach proposed by Ramachandran et al. (2006) is an example of a 
signature-based Botnet detection system (Ramachandran et al., 2006). DNSBL-based 
approaches look for known bot signatures within the monitored DNS traffic. DNSBL-
based approaches are also used to publish malicious and spamming activities online 
through collecting IP addresses of server machines or networks related to these 
activities. DNSBL based approaches attempt to recognize the botmasters’ address and 
identify their location. However, the limitation of DNSBL-based approaches resides 
in maintaining an up-to-date database of known malicious addresses. Unfortunately, 
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one of the basic lines of defense against DNS abuses is domain name blacklisting (Oro 
et al., 2010; Sinha et al., 2008). 
Similarly, Antonakakis et al. (2010) built a dynamic DNS (DDNS) reputation 
system called “Notos” that uses the passive DNS query data and analyzes the network 
and zone feature of a domain name. The Notos system assumed that malicious DNS 
queries have distinctive characteristics that are distinguishable from benign DNS 
queries (Antonakakis et al., 2010). Thus, observing DNS queries and building models 
of known malicious and benign domains is feasible and might lead to a good result. A 
reputation score for the new domain observed was computed by models that give low 
scores for malicious domains and high scores for benign domains to differentiate 
between them. The Notos system has achieved high accuracy and low false positive 
rate, and it can recognize new domains before they get released to the public blacklist. 
However, the system needs a lot of history for a given domain name to reach a correct 
reputation score and it is inaccurate against frequently changing C&C domains, such 
as the hybrid botnet architecture that uses many master C&C nodes to distribute its 
commands (Kheir et al., 2014).  
In contrast to previous work, the mentor approach proposed by Kheir et al. 
(2014) depended on removing the legitimate domains from the botnet C&C blacklisted 
domains to reduce the false positive ratio during the detection process. The mentor 
approach implements scalable, positive DNS reputation approach that automatically 
removes benign or harmless domains recorded inside a blacklist of botnet C&C 
domains (Kheir et al., 2014). The mentor approach collects statistical features about a 
suspected domain name, such as DNS properties and web content to build a DNS 
pruning model by applying a supervised learning approach into a labeled set of known 
benign and malicious domain names. The result of the mentor approach was effective 
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after testing over a public blacklist, and it removed benign domain names with a very 
low false positive rate. However, this approach relying on supervised machine learning 
and it also needs to be trained thus suffering from the ground truth problem 
(Stevanovic et al., 2015). 
Yadav et al. (2010) proposed an approach to detect “domain fluxes” in DNS 
traffic through searching for algorithmically generated patterns in domain names that 
are different from the domains generated by humans (Yadav et al., 2010). They 
observed a distribution of alphanumeric characters together with the bigrams of all the 
domains mapped to the same set of IP addresses. However, this system is limited to 
the detection of C&C domains for only known malware samples that are correctly 
performed in the training phase, so it cannot identify unknown botnets (Kheir et al., 
2014). Table 2.1 shows a summary of DNS signature-based botnet detection 
approaches. Generally, the signature-based detection approaches have many 
limitations; mainly, they require constant updating to detect the new botnets or zero-
day botnet attacks in which the signatures are evolving (Silva et al., 2013).  
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Table 2.1: Summary of DNS Signature-based Botnet Detection Approaches 
Proposed model Mechanism Weakness 
DNSBL 
(Ramachandran 
et al., 2006) 
 Collecting published IP 
addresses of server machines 
 Update DNS-based 
blacklist 
 Hard to design evasion 
approaches 
Notos 
(Antonakakis et 
al., 2010) 
 Dynamic DNS reputation 
system 
 Uses passive DNS query data to 
analyze the network feature of a 
domain name 
 Requires a long history 
for the given domain 
name to make reputation 
score 
 Unreliable with hybrid 
botnet  
Mentor 
(Kheir et al., 
2014) 
 Removing the legitimate 
domains from the botnet C&C 
domains blacklist 
 Relying on supervised 
machine learning and it 
also needs to be trained 
thus suffering from the 
ground truth problem 
Yadav 
(Yadav et al., 
2010) 
 Detect domain fluxes in DNS 
traffic  
 Seeking for algorithmically 
generated patterns inherent to 
domain names  
 Limited to known 
botnets 
 Attacks evaded detection 
during analysis  
 
2.3.2(b) Anomaly DNS-based Botnet Detection Approaches 
The anomaly- or behavior-based approaches attempted to detect botnets 
through analyzing network traffic for anomalies such as a sudden vast amount of 
traffic, traffic to unusual ports, high network latency, and anomalous behavior that 
may indicate the existence of bots in the network (Zeidanloo et al., 2010). These 
approaches have the ability to identify new bots. The anomaly-based approach can be 
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categorized into host-based and network-based detection approaches (Karim et al., 
2014; Silva et al., 2013; Zeidanloo et al., 2010).  
 
2.3.2(c) Host-based Anomaly Detection Approaches 
In host-based approaches, the monitoring and analyzing process are performed locally 
at each individual computer to detect any malicious activities through monitoring 
system processes, access to kernel level routines and system calls (Karim et al., 2014). 
An example of the host-based approach is BotSwat, which was proposed by Stinson 
and Mitchell (2007) (Stinson and Mitchell, 2007). BotSwat focuses on the way bots 
respond to data received over the network through monitoring the execution of an 
arbitrary Win32 binary. However, the main limitation of the host-based botnet 
detection approach is that it is not scalable and limited to only bots within the 
monitored hosts. Moreover, to cover a wider view of the network, each individual host 
should be equipped with powerful monitoring tools that work collaboratively with 
others (Zeidanloo et al., 2010). 
One of the key approaches that focus on monitoring DNS traffic at the 
host/network level is the EFFORT framework that was proposed by (Shin et al., 2012). 
This framework aims for effective and efficient detection through applying the multi 
module approach that correlates bot-related indications from different clients and 
network-level aspects. The EFFORT framework used a supervised machine learning 
algorithm to distinguish the queried domain names as being benign or malicious. The 
EFFORT framework is independent of topology, deployed communication protocol, 
and capable of detecting encrypted protocols. However, EFFORT is limited in its 
scope to botnets that depend on DNS services for identifying the address of their C&C 
